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ABSTRACT
Analysis of Periodicity in Botnets
by Prathiba Nagarajan
A botnet consists of a network of infected computers which are controlled remotely via a command and control (C&C) server. A typical botnet requires frequent
communication between the C&C server and the infected nodes. Previous approaches
to detecting botnets have employed various machine learning techniques, based on
features extracted from network traffic. In this research, we carefully analyze the periodicity of traffic as a means for detecting a variety of botnets by applying machine
learning to publicly available datasets.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware is defined as a “malicious software program” [1]. It started as an annoying nuisance to computer users and has advanced to its current position of a very
high security threat worldwide. Malware detectors, which are software utilities used
to detect and remove malware, are the primary tools used in defense against malware.
Their techniques have also grown with the growing complexity of malware and involve
the combination of static and dynamic analysis for detection.
The prospect of malware as a security threat was little known when the first major Internet worm became popular in 1988 [2]. Malware writing has evolved now from
being a hobby to a profession. One of the malicious security threats at present, are the
Botnets. Malicious botnets are a network of infected computers which are controlled
remotely, by Command and Control (C&C) servers, without the knowledge of the
user. The most recent Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack shut down half
of the infrastructure of the Internet [3] and disrupted people’s lives to a large extent.
Some longstanding botnets such as Windigo [4] have only been recently detected.
Some of the other popular botnets have been taken down and others are expanding.
As we have increased our dependence on the Internet from social media to the Internet of Things, our expectations of the malware detection techniques have grown.
Since botnets expand and communicate using the network as the main propagation
medium [5], it is a popular research subject in the field of network analysis.
Network analysis is a branch of dynamic analysis which involves detection of
malware by inspecting the features of packet traffic. Previous research on network
analysis as an independent feature for malware detection has shown positive results.
The basic working of the botnets requires frequent communication between the C&C
server(s) and the infected computers. This project inspects this frequent communi1

cation from the perspective of periodicity.
Periodicity is defined as the “recurrence of similar observations at regular intervals”. Periodic patterns could shed light on the characteristics of the underlying
processes. For instance, in the case of network traffic, periodicity can be an indicator
of network congestion [6]. The focus of this project is on the periodicity features of
the various network protocols and their payloads of the botnet traffic across various
botnets.
The report is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces botnets and their working, followed by a brief description of network protocols and their usage by the botnets.
Chapter 3 introduces the related work to network analysis with an insight into the
static and dynamic analysis. Chapter 4 deals with the details of the experiments
performed and the results obtained, followed by the conclusions in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
This chapter provides a brief insight into the working of botnets, before diving
into the rest of the project. Also, since botnet communication depends only on the
existence of a network, a cursory glance at the glossary of network terms followed by
the various layers and protocols is given. The chapter concludes with the preferred
protocols used by the botnets and a brief description of the various types of network
attacks.
2.1

Introduction to Botnets
Also known as ‘zombie army’ [7], the infected nodes are controlled by a main

set of server(s) called Command and Control (C&C). The ‘controller’ servers send
commands to direct the infected terminals to help with attacks such as collecting
sensitive information from the user’s computers to demand a ransom, for financial
theft and so on.
2.1.1

Botnet Lifecycle

Botnets follows similar steps to ‘recruit’ a vulnerable system and use it for malicious purposes, and hence is said to have a lifecycle. The components in the above
lifecycle are repeated since a larger botnet results in a bigger malicious effect. The
main components of the lifecycle [7] are given in Figure 1.
The C&C servers propagate the malicious software via emails, software vulnerabilities, unsecured file sharing etc. to various nodes. The nodes which are infected
start communicating with the C&C server without the user’s knowledge. After infection, the botmaster may send commands to the infected computers or may be polled
regularly by the bots. These commands are issued to execute tasks such as expanding
the botnet by propagating the malware further or erasing all evidence and abandoning the node. The infected computers are then used for malicious coordinated attacks
3

Figure 1: Lifecycle of a botnet
when commanded by the C&C server.
The C&C server provides software updates to the infected systems as and when
required.
2.1.2

Command and Control

The C&C servers are the main component in the survival of botnets [8]. If
they are taken down or the communication channel is interrupted, the botnet army
is presumed useless for malicious activities. The botnet adopts the centralized and
distributed network models for its activities. The centralized model is implemented
using hierarchical or star (single or multi server at the core) topologies. There is no
latency in the communication to the infected terminal which helps in a more coordinated attack. But this has the single point-of-failure disadvantage. The distributed
model is a peer to peer topology and constitutes multiple C&Cs which are harder
to take down. But, the message delivery to other infected terminals is a complex
process.

4

2.2

Network Protocols and Botnet Communication
This section will provide a basic overview of the terms generally used in the

networking field and the protocols used by botnets for communication.
2.2.1

Glossary of Terms

Mentioned below are some of the common networking terms used in this documentation and their brief description.
• Connection — Connection refers to the necessary arrangements made in the
form of status and related information exchange so that data transfer can take
place between two nodes.
• Packet — Packets are the most basic units that are transferred over the network.
They contain the header and payload information. Header information consists
of the source and destination addresses, time stamps, and other data depending
upon the network protocol. Payload consists of the data or pieces of the data
that needs to be transferred, which will be combined by the protocol at the
destination.
• Protocol — Protocols are sets of rules/standards used to define the communication method between devices. There are many different protocols used for
different purposes, which will be elaborated in the next section.
• Port — Ports are specific addresses in the node where a logical connection
takes place. Some commonly used protocols have preassigned port numbers
(such as port 80 for Hypertext Transfer Protocol) where the server and client
can exchange data using the defined protocol in the defined ports. The other
connections are assigned ports dynamically for communication.
• Firewall — Firewall is a software program which inspects the traffic coming into
a node at its ports. The program is set with rules which is used to check the

5

packets/connection and reject or accept it.
2.2.2

Network Layers and Protocols

The different layers of network communication can be explained by the historic
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Model or Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) model. The OSI model and the various protocols in the
network stack, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Various Protocols in the layers of the OSI Model
The TCP/IP model defines network layers that overlap with the OSI model.
Since it has fewer layers than the OSI Model, it is more flexible and also used as
a model for the internet. Hence, it is also called the Internet Suite. The Application Layer directly interacts with the end user and provides many services like
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Internet Relay Chat (IRC) etc. The Presentation Layer, present below the application layer, is responsible for integrating
formats and presenting data in a standardized format via encryption/decryption,
compression/decompression etc. The establishment and control of sessions between
6

end user applications is taken care of by the Session Layer. It uses protocols such as
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) to do the needful.
Transport Layer ensures reliable communication via flow control, segmentation
and error control. It uses either connection oriented protocol (TCP) or connection-less
User Datagram Protocol (UDP). The Network Layer takes care of routing and packet
forwarding. As a consequence, it manages the Quality of Service (QoS). It supports
protocols such as Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and Datagram Delivery
Protocol (DDP) Data Link Layer looks into forwarding data to the adjacent nodes
within a Local Area Network (LAN) or Wide Area Network (WAN). It is responsible
for logical link control and media access control. Physical Layer is the first and lowest
layer which looks into transmitting data as raw bits over the network hardware.
2.2.3

Botnet Communication

The IRC and HTTP protocols are popular among the botnets for communication.
The IRC protocol facilitates communication between clients in the form of text. The
chat servers act as intermediary to transfer messages between clients. Due to the
scalability and flexibility in the protocol [9], it can be extended to suit the needs of
the bot application. They are easy to set up and maintain but are focused to specific
servers.
The HTTP protocol is also commonly used by botnets, which use HTML to
communicate. The inherent simplicity of its usage comes from the fact that it can
easily blend into the normal HTTP traffic. The bots exploit few tags in certain
compromised sites to communicate with the infected nodes, when visited [7].
Some use TCP/IP and ICMP for their decentralized communications. Some
bots use instant messaging (IM) which is similar to IRC, but contains difficulties in
creating new accounts when the botnet is expanding.

7

There are two different ways to initiate connections, namely, Push and Pull [7].
In the Push method, the bot controller pushes the required commands via broadcast
methods to the entire botnet. The advantage of this is that it is easier to coordinate
attacks, but the botmaster needs a broadcast method to reach the entire network
successfully. In the Pull method, the infected nodes periodically poll the botmaster
for updates and commands. This can be done with the botmaster sending a query
to the infected computers to start polling or a schedule with regular intervals in the
botnet.
The malicious applications that the botnets were built for decide the directionality of communications required. Some botnets have bidirectional communication
where information is returned for the query sent by the botmaster. Unidirectional
communication have the botmasters sending commands for a task to be executed by
the infected computer (such as extending the botnet).
2.2.4

Network Attacks Overview

Network attacks can be defined as an intrusion into the network infrastructure [10]. Sometimes the attack intends to silently collect data without harming
the network’s resources. This is called a passive attack. Active attacks have a main
intention of destroying or tampering with the data and resources with or without the
help of malware.
The types of potential threats to the networks is always evolving, due to which
its security is an important part of the design. Some of the common network attacks
overview is mentioned below.
• Packet sniffing works at the Ethernet frame level and is a passive attack. The
packet sniffer software is generally used by network administrators to detect
faults in the network infrastructure. By the hackers, it is used to spy on conver-
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sations between two terminals, steal passwords, etc. by analyzing the decrypted
traffic originating from the terminals. Depending on the network infrastructure,
the packet sniffers may have access to the entire network or only a certain segment of it.
• Port scanning is used by network administrators to check the security policies.
By the attackers, it is used to see the type of services running at the port
and look for vulnerabilities. Port scanning is done in various ways such as FTP
Bounce scan, which is using File Transfer Protocol (FTP) as a mask for scanning
in order to disguise the attacker’s location, and using fragmented packets to get
through the filters in the firewall.
• Spoofing is falsifying data in order to imitate a person or software for malicious
purposes. There are different areas in which this technique is used and a few of
them are given below:
– DNS spoofing — False data inserted into the DNS Server Cache to redirect
users to the attacker’s address of choice.
– IP address spoofing — Creating and sending packets of data with the
source IP address of a legitimate system in order to bypass firewalls.
– Email spoofing — Falsifying the ‘From:’ field of an email in order to hide
the actual origin of the email.
• Denial of Service (DoS) is used to flood the target server with a huge amount
of spam and useless communications, so that the service becomes unavailable
to legitimate requests. When DoS is achieved using multiple infected systems
to target a particular service, it is called Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack. One of the common types of DoS is called SYN flood attack, wherein
multiple TCP requests with SYN flag set are sent to the host to enable the ports
for the connection. But neither any packets with FIN flag set nor any data is
9

sent, due to which the ports are occupied and unavailable to other connections.
The ICMP flood attack works in a similar way with ICMP requests.
• For terminals that do not use a protocol to secure their connections, the attacker
can intercept the conversations and tamper with them. In this way, the attacker
can successfully impersonate one of the end points so as to disguise the tampered
data as legitimate replies. This is called Man-in-the-middle attack.
• Session hijacking attack, also known as cookie hijacking, the attacker captures
the cookies of an unsecured conversation between terminals, using which the
attacker can gain unauthorized access into secure servers.

10

CHAPTER 3
Related Work
Malware detection techniques can be broadly classified into static and dynamic
analysis. Static analysis explores the external features of the malicious executable,
without executing it. The examples include code analysis, code or string fingerprint
detection, etc. Dynamic analysis examines the malware behavior when executed in a
controlled environment, such as monitoring the registry and network processes.
Network traffic analysis is part of dynamic analysis and has been used as one
of the many features in machine learning for malware detection, until recently. It
consists of examining the header and payload of various traffic protocols of a particular
process, for any discrepancies or anomalies.
This chapter will give a brief overview of the literature using static and dynamic
analysis for malware detection, followed by network analysis for botnet and other
malware detection.
3.1

Static Analysis
Malware detection techniques started with static analysis. Schultz et al. [11] used

the Naive Bayes algorithm on the features of Portable Executable (PE) metadata to
achieve a detection of 97%, and were considered the pioneers in the usage of machine
learning techniques for malware detection using static analysis. The study used the
Darpa 1999 dataset, and there have been many advancements since then.
Leder et al. [12] used a procedure known as Value Set Analysis (VSA) which
tracked the propagation and changes in the values of executables for detection. They
aimed their study at metamorphic malware, and were able to achieve 100% accuracy.
Metamorphic malware are a malware variant which have specific characteristics of
replication. Austin et al. [13] identified similarities in different viruses using dueling
Hidden Markov Models (HMM). They built multiple sets of models on benign and
11

malware files, and achieved an accuracy of 90%. The study looked at compiler and
construction kits, with focus on metamorphic malware.
Using techniques from other domains, such as image processing, also broadened
the knowledge of the underlying structure of malware. Nataraj et al. [14] produced
a similarity measure based on texture and layout of malware files using image processing techniques. They achieved a classification accuracy of 98%. This method has
resilience to obfuscation, but is very sensitive to code relocation or redundant data,
which may distort the results. Rad et al. [15] used a ‘histogram of opcodes’ method to
achieve 100% classification accuracy. The study used disassembled malware binaries
of a small dataset of PE files, to classify malware from benign files. As the dataset
increases, there may be a blur in the distinction.
A summary of the above mentioned research is given in Table 1. Moser et al. [16]
showed that static analysis alone is insufficient for classification. They used simple
obfuscation techniques to evade advanced signature based detection. This gave way
to the research and popularization of dynamic analysis.
Table 1: Introduction to Static Analysis Literature
Authors
Schultz et al.

Method
Naive Bayes

Accuracy
97%

Leder et al.

VSA

100%

Austin et al.

HMM

90%

Nataraj et al.

Image Processing

98%

Rad et al.

Histogram of opcodes

100%
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Comments
Pioneers of using machine learning for malware detection.
Focus on metamorphic
malware.
Focus on metamorphic
malware, compiler, and
construction kits.
Sensitive to location of
code.
Tests run on a small
dataset.

3.2

Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis helped give a peek into the malware behavior and its effect on

the system processes. Table 2 summarizes this work. Bailey et al. [17] used the effect
of malware behavior on the system, in terms of creation of processes and network
activity, to detect malware. The study looked at all types of malware, but each of
the malware was executed for less than 5 minutes. Generally, malware behavior has
certain dependence on the characteristics of the external environment. They may
have specific behaviors that manifest after a particular period of time, and hence
time is a limitation.
Firdausi et al. [18] analyzed the behavior of malware using sparse vector models
and achieved an accuracy of 93.6% with the J48 Decision Tree algorithm. Okazaki
et al. [19] modeled normal behavior by ranking the frequency of system calls. They
achieved improved detected over previous techniques. Blokhin et al. [20] used the similarity of system call subsequences to achieve a high degree of precision in identifying
known malware family labels. The authors of the papers mentioned above, used a
Virtual Machine (VM) to isolate the malware behavior, which is also a disadvantage
since the malware may not be exhaustive in their behavior.
Nari et al. [21] applied the J48 decision tree algorithm on a framework which
utilized the network behavior of a malware to create a behavior graph. They achieved
a high classification accuracy using the network traces of the malware out in the wild,
which gives a more accurate representation, with certain specific protocols only.
3.3

Network Analysis
The section is divided into malicious botnet detection and non-botnet malware

detection and is summarized in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively.
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Table 2: Introduction to Dynamic Analysis Literature
Authors
Bailey et al.

Method
Clustering of
malware behavior

Accuracy
91%

Firdausi et al.

J48 decision tree on
vector models
J48 decision tree on
behavior graph

96.8%

Nari et al.

3.3.1

57-98%

Comments
Clustering according to the
change in system processes.
VM to isolate malware
behavior.
Better performance than
anti
virus
programs
compared.

Malicious Botnet Detection

Botnets utilize Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, open file sharing frameworks, and
even “hit lists” to detect vulnerable IP addresses for infection among many other
network propagation methods [22]. Tyagi et al. [23] focused on detecting periodicity of similar contents in a particular flow using N-Gram analysis and Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI). The study clustered the similar flows and checked the similarity
score using a distance metric. They also used a timing analyzer which checked the
time of similar communication flows. The authors generated a synthetic dataset by
setting up the Command and Control (C&C) server for a Zeus Bot, with fast flux
, and achieved a 98% detection accuracy. The study uses only the HTTP protocol,
and the result of application to a larger dataset is yet to be determined.
Stevanovic and Pederson [24] used more than 20 features of DNS, TCP and UDP
protocols to classify traffic from 40 botnets extracted from public datasets such as
ISCX [25] and ISOT botnet traffic dataset. They applied random forests classifier
with the three set of features on network traces found in the wild to achieve an
detection accuracy of 99%. Jin et al. [26] created a database of authoritative name
server record (DNS TXT record) and IP address from the server, and used them to
differentiate the traffic. They achieved a ‘hit’ of 19% on the IP address per day. The
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study uses IP addresses, which may not stay constant.
Beigi et al. [25] applied a decision tree classifier on the byte based, duration based,
behavior based and packet based features on approximately three botnet traces. They
achieved a detection range of 75 to 99%. A larger dataset could have revealed more
information regarding the accuracy. Adamov et al. [27] conducted a study about the
type of files downloaded, the protocol, and encryption information along with the
commands and unique characteristics of popular bots. Their focus on the anomaly
details in the traffic can be used to increase the detection accuracy. This research uses
a different perspective, and focuses on the details, but the generality of the method
is unknown.
The strongly periodic, weakly periodic and not periodic characteristics of network
features in botnets was discussed by Garcia. [4]. Depending on the flow size, he set
thresholds to easily categorize the data. Using Markov chains and the transport layer
protocols, they were able to achieve a F-measure of 93%.
Eslahi et al. [1] use the metrics such as periodic factor, range of absolute frequencies, and time sequence factor to determine periodicity in HTTP botnets. They
define periodic factor to be a metric of time in which the corresponding activities of
the botnet take place. A decision tree classification on their dataset based on the
above metrics shows Neris and Zeus to be strongly periodic.
3.3.2

Non-Botnet Malware Detection

Malwares such as virus, worms, DoS malware, scanners, etc. utilize the network
infrastructure for propagation and attacks. Celik et al. [28] generated more than
40 data features from the header and payload details, such as count of payload,
min/mean/variance of bytes, etc. They used four types of algorithms: clustering
(K-means), density (OCSVM) and least-square cost (LSAD) algorithms to generate
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Table 3: Literature of network analysis in botnets
Authors
Tyagi et al.

Method
Cluster similar flows according to periodicity

Accuracy
98%

Stevanovic and
Pederson

Random Forests classification on 20 features of
TCP,UDP and DNS
Database of name server
records and IP addresses
Decision tree classifier

99%

Jin et al.
Beigi et al.

19% ‘hit’
75-99%

Comments
Tested on synthetic
data for Zeus with fast
flux.
Tested
on
public
dataset.
Data may not stay
constant.
Three traces of botnets tested.

results on 16 malware families taken from public datasets. They noted a substantial
decrease in detection in the recent malware families which may be connected with
some traffic protocols disguised as other protocols. The number of features and
techniques in the study, sheds light on the effectiveness of each.
Table 4: Literature of network analysis in other malware
Authors
Celik et al.
Li et al.

Method
Four types of algorithms over 40 protocol features
Clustering
network
activity of Trojans

Results
AUC varied from 0.75
to 0.98
90% accuracy

Comments
Disguise of one protocol as another reduced
accuracy.
Generality of method
unknown.

Iorliam et al. [29] applied Benford’s Law on TCP traffic flow size and flow difference in the malware to examine the degree of variation. They tested on multiple
public datasets and observed that the flows followed the law to a satisfactory degree.
One of the recent datasets they tested on had significantly lower TCP flows and hence
was less representative. This is a new and focused perspective and can be explored
further.
Heard et al. [30] experimented with Fourier analysis of traffic conducted to model
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non-malicious polling traffic, and detect malicious traffic using a periodogram. They
used the peaks in the periodogram (polling frequency) and also mapped the “time of
day” distribution. They mapped the user activity and the periodicity generated by
the applications, but the types of periodic user network activity were limited. Li et
al. [31] focused on clustering the network activity of Trojan malware communication
and achieved an accuracy of 90% with less than 3.5% false positive rate. Since this
study is focused on Trojan malware, the generality of the method is unknown.
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CHAPTER 4
Experiments and Results
4.1

Protocols Used
The sample protocol hierarchy of the benign (normal) and botnet packet captures

are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively. The network communication in the
TCP and DNS protocols are common across both. Furthermore, the HTTP protocol
under TCP has a special significance—it occupies a significant portion of the TCP
communications and many botnets use HTTP as the protocol of choice. Hence, this
project focuses on the features of HTTP, TCP, and DNS.
The TCP Features encompass the data of all the protocols other than HTTP
under the TCP umbrella. This is to account for the botnets which use Voice over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) and other such protocols [6] for their malicious activities,
which fall under TCP.
4.2

Feature Selection
The features have been selected keeping techniques such as Domain Generation

Algorithms (DGA) and Tunneling in mind. DGAs are used to generate different
domain names periodically so that taking down the main C&Cs is difficult. Tunneling
technique is used to piggyback one protocol data over another in order to avoid
firewalls. One example of this is DNS tunneling. The summary of the features is
given in Figure 5.
4.2.1

DNS Features

DNS is the identification system for resources connected to the internet. A DNS
query translates a domain name to a IP address. There are various kinds of query
and response types. Types such as ‘A’ or ‘AAAA’ are used when a new domain name
needs to be translated to its IP address. Among the other types, the ‘TXT’ record is
used by the server to add a non-formatted string, which can be exploited by botnets
18

Figure 3: Protocol Hierarchy of Normal Activity

Figure 4: Protocol Hierarchy Zeus bot
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Table 5: Feature set
Protocol

DNS

HTTP

TCP

Feature
Query Type
Response Type
Frame Length
Frame Delta Time
Query Name
Response TTL
Answer Count
Reply (Response) Code
Response Length
Length of Domain
Count of Digits in Domain
Bigram Query Score
Request Method
Content Type
Response Code
Content Length
URL Length
Cache Time
Cache Type
Header elements
Bigram Score
Request Interval
Time since request
Keep Alive status
Segment Length
Flags status
iRTT
Length of connection
Port

Description
The type of the query
The type of the response
The length of the data frame
Time elapsed since the previous data frame
The second level domain (SLD)
The response time to live
The number of answers for the query
The response code
The length of the response
The length of the SLD
The number of digits present in the SLD
The bigram score of the domain
The method used for request
The type of content
The status code received
The length of the content
The length of URLs
The time of cache
The type of cache
The number of header elements
The bigram score of data
The interval between similar requests
The time elapsed since the request
The status of keep-alive flag
The TCP segment length
The number of flags set
The initially estimated round trip time
The connection duration
The port number used

to bypass firewalls [8]. In techniques such as tunneling, the length of the frame will
be higher than normal, owing to the extra protocol data. If the length of the response
is unusually high, it may point to a DDoS attack. The communication between the
botmaster and the bot happens frequently and hence the ‘delta time’ feature is used
to observe how often the requests and responses are being sent.
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The Second Level Domain (SLD) points to the owner of the domain. Taking an
example of ‘google.com’, ‘google’ is the SLD to the ‘.com’ Top Level Domain (TLD).
This feature is used to extract other features such as length of the domain, number
of digits in the domain and bigram query score. The bigram score of the domain
w.r.t the English language, without the digits, is calculated to measure the human
readability of the domain. The score points towards the commonality of usage of the
bigrams, which may not be a factor for domains supporting malware. The response
code describes the success or failure of the query. These features are helpful in the case
of DGAs where the length of the domain is usually longer, requires many permutations
for flexibility and all of the generated domains are not generally registered,
The time to live (TTL) is a technique used to limit the validity of the DNS
Record. The record is cached until the validity expires, after which is it looked up
again. The TTL is used to achieve a balance between fast access to websites (high
TTL) and quick changes to the domain (low TTL). The number of answers received
for the query is generally the number of IP addresses through which the domain can
be accessed.
4.2.2

HTTP Features

HTTP is an application level protocol that is a popular choice of communication
among botnets. The request methods such as GET, POST, PUT, etc. are retrieved
for the HTTP request. The type of content received may be an image, file or a HTML
web page in text form. This is extracted in a numerical form.
The status code received for HTTP request, which may be a ‘Success’ or a ‘Server
not found’, is important and may be higher in the case of DGAs. The length of the
content received is also extracted since abnormally large content size may point to
tunneling or attacks.
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The time the resources could be cached and the type of cache is usually used for
performance in a scenario where a user frequents a web page. The number of standard
header elements being set in a response is also extracted. The interval between similar
requests will support the concept of periodicity since the botnets may have similar
requests for repeating activities at regular intervals.
4.2.3

TCP Features

TCP is a connection oriented protocol. The ‘keep alive’ flag is used to determine
if the connection is still valid. Some malware also use TCP segments with flags set
and empty payloads to keep the connection valid. The botnets set these flags in order
to keep the socket busy, which helps in DDoS and zero day attacks.
The initially estimated RTT determines the base latency of the connection. The
duration that the TCP connection lasts is also extracted. This is the difference
between the time the ‘SYN’ and ‘SYN/‘FIN’ flags are sent.
The port number being used for the connection is used to correlate between the
type of traffic generally seen at the port and traffic seen when techniques such as
tunneling are used.
4.3

Techniques
There are various methods to identify the periodicity of a time domain signal.

Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) finds the periodicity of a signal by transforming
it into the frequency domain. The other method, followed in this project, is called
Autocorrelation, which is basically cross-correlation of a signal with itself to identify
the periodicity.
4.3.1

Autocorrelation

In auto-correlation, the signal is correlated with itself and this helps to verify the
presence of cycles and determine their duration. In this method, the auto-correlation

22

result shows peaks at various instants of time. Typically, a signal can have short and
long period cycles. So we could use a peak level threshold which can be iteratively
varied to identify long and short periods.
The main reason for choosing to use autocorrelation is the kind of dataset that is
available for analysis. The datasets are a mixture of periodic and aperiodic samples.
Implementation of autocorrelation function is straight-forward irrespective of the periodic or aperiodic nature of samples. So the results obtained are complete. On the
other hand, DFT relies on a fixed sampling rate for determining the periodicity. For
aperiodic sampling, DFT cannot be applied. In this case, non-uniform DFT also have
to be implemented. This approximately doubles the processing time of computation.
Given below, in Figures 5 and 6 are the plots of a periodic and aperiodic signal, and
their autocorrelation trends respectively.
4.3.2

Rolling Statistics

The rolling statistics consists of the rolling average/mean, sum, standard deviation, and variance in this project. These statistics are applied on specific ‘windows’,
and the windows are then shifted over the progress of the data. These statistics are
used to smooth out the short-term noise and bring forward the trend present, if any.
These statistics have been applied over the dataset in the hope that the insignificant requests/packets are smoothed out giving a clearer picture of the underlying
periodicity/randomness.
4.3.3

Support Vector Machines (SVM)

In machine learning, a SVM is a supervised learning algorithm which is generally
used for binary classification [32]. The algorithm uses a hyperplane to separate the
data with maximum margins in a high-dimension space, if required. It uses a labeled
training dataset to create a model, which is used on the test dataset to generate the
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Figure 5: Autocorrelation of a periodic signal
estimated labels.
4.3.4

Clustering

Clustering is the process of grouping data that are similar or have some common
characteristics. Cluster analysis falls under the category of unsupervised machine
learning wherein the inherent structure of data is deduced from unlabeled data. This
project has also been analyzed from the perspective of clustering to infer similarity
in the grouping of botnet data in terms of periodicity. Two algorithms were looked
into: k-means and Expectation-maximization (EM). Both k-means and EM work by
grouping the data points according to a centralized vector. EM assigns a probability
of a data point belonging to a particular cluster and produces spherical as well as
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Figure 6: Autocorrelation of a aperiodic/random signal
elliptical clusters. k-means is a variant of the EM algorithm, assigns a data point
specifically to clusters and produces spherical clusters.
4.4

Tools and Languages Used
Wireshark is a free and open source network packet analyzer for Windows and

Unix. Tshark is its command line companion, using which the features were extracted
on Windows. The version used is 2.2.1. Microsoft Excel is used to store the data and
generate plots. Lua is used for writing packet dissectors, which dissect packet details.
In this project, the dissectors were used to extract data and return it as features
of a custom protocol. Python is used to manipulate data stored in the excel to
generate autocorrelation and rolling statistics data. The ‘numpy’ built-in libraries
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Figure 7: SVM Classification of two classes of data
were used to generate the rolling statistics, ‘sklearn’ package was used for executing
SVM, generating accuracy data and Area Under the Curve (AUC) statistics.
4.5

Dataset
The datasets used are all available to the public and have been used for both

botnet and benign data. The Contagio Malware Dump [33] consists of many malware
and botnet packet captures and binaries. The Stratosphere IPS dataset [34] is a sister
project of the Malware Capture Facility Project (MCFP), it is dedicated to the packet
capture and binaries of more than 200 traces of botnets. The ISCX dataset [25]was
created by the Information Security Centre for Excellence (ISCX) as an amalgam
of its 2012 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) dataset, ISOT dataset and the MCFP
dataset containing 13 traces of botnet packet captures and benign data.
4.6

Procedure
Three categories of botnets, according to their end application, were chosen tak-

ing into account the dataset availability. This was done to detect any existence of a
relationship between the periodicity and their end application. The categories and
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botnets chosen were:
• Financial – Bots which look into stealing credentials, banking fraud, targeting
financial institutions,etc. were categorized under this label. The bots chosen
were Zeus, Tinba, SpyEye, and Citadel.
• Spam and DDoS – This category comprised of botnets used to generate spam
or disrupt services or both. The bots looked into were Rbot, a Storm variant,
Agobot, Avzhan, and Cutwail-Pushdo.
• Ransomware – The bots which held data hostage or threatened to publish the
user’s data unless a ransom was paid to a specific source fell under this category.
The bots analyzed were Cerber, Locky, and Cryptolocker.
The dataset packet capture (pcap) data for the botnets and normal activity was
taken from the datasets and the respective features were extracted using protocol
dissectors written in Lua and executed using tshark. Protocol dissectors are used
to analyze the protocol data. When a dissector is registered, if an incoming packet
matches the type of the dissector, it is analyzed. In this project, the dissector is used
to extract the data, manipulate it, and produce the data feature as part of a custom
protocol. The custom protocols defined were ‘deepdns’, ‘deephttp’ and ‘deeptcp’, and
the features extracted were defined as protocol attributes.
These data features were extracted to an excel sheet, which was then used as
input to the python scripts. The python scripts were written to generate the autocorrelation, rolling statistics over 75 ‘windows’ and perform SVM on the normal as
well as the malware data.
4.7

Autocorrelation Results
In the case of a large dataset, the DNS and TCP plots are shown for randomly

selected specific connections with significant packet data. A basic SVM with no
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options set, was used for detection.
4.7.1

Normal Activity

The data for normal traces was taken from the Stratosphere IPS dataset. Figures 8, 9, and 10 show the network analysis of normal/benign activity. As expected,
the working does not show any periodicity.

Figure 8: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Normal Activity

Figure 9: Autocorrelation plots of HTTP Features - Normal Activity
4.7.2

Financial Botnets

Financial botnets mostly aim to steal credentials, capture keystrokes etc. in
order to inflict financial harm. The threat countered,design and working of botnets
have been specifically studied previously [35] [36]. The periodicity analysis is given
below.
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Figure 10: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Normal Activity
4.7.2.1

Citadel

The botnet traces were taken from the Contagio dataset. The DNS and TCP
autocorrelation shown in Figure 11 and Figure 13 seem to have a strong periodicity,
with a short term periodicity of about 11 and a long term periodicity of around 350,
shown by the peaks. The HTTP plot shows a periodicity of 2 – The packet capture
shows similar requests (with different data) and responses going around repeatedly.

Figure 11: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Citadel
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Figure 12: Autocorrelation plots of HTTP Features - Citadel

Figure 13: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Citadel
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4.7.2.2

SpyEye

Like Citadel, SpyEye also shows a periodicity of 2 as shown in Figure 14. The
domain length seems to have a weak periodicity of around 13, but without more data,
it cannot be confirmed. This trace is taken from the Contagio dataset. The Figure 15
also shows a weak periodicity of around 23 across all features, and is surrounded by
noise.

Figure 14: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - SpyEye
Most of the TCP features in Figure 16 seem to have a periodicity of around 81
packets.
4.7.2.3

Zeus

The data acquired from the Stratosphere IPS dataset shows packet data of the
infected computer with two C&Cs, which is shown in Figure 18. Both plots are
slightly similar and seem to have a periodicity of 2. The DNS trend in Figure 17 and
TCP trend in Figure 19 also does not seem to show any periodicity.
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Figure 15: Autocorrelation plots of HTTP Features - SpyEye
4.7.2.4

Tinba

Tinba was the world’s smallest malware, until Andromeda took over, at 13 Kb.
The analysis of the traces taken from the Stratosphere IPS dataset is shown in Figure 20, Figure 21 and Figure 22. The DNS plots look like noise, but the domain
length seems to have a undefinable trend. There seem to be peaks at around 5000 in
both DNS and TCP, but nothing definite. The HTTP data was taken from a trace
that has sinkholed domains (DNS servers are sometimes configured to return false
IP addresses to malicious URLs, thereby preventing the connection establishment).
But, the data score feature seems to have a consistent trend, but without more data,
it cannot be confirmed.
4.7.3

Ransomware

Ransomware is a malware that installs stealthily on a user’s computer and holds
the user data hostage until a sum of money is paid. The analysis of Cerber, Cryp-
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Figure 16: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - SpyEye

Figure 17: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Zeus
tolocker and Locky is given below.
4.7.3.1

Cerber

Cerber’s trace is taken from the Stratosphere IPS dataset. The DNS and TCP
data shown in Figures 23 and 25 is inconclusive. However, most of the general HTTP
features in Figure 24 show an almost ideal trend and periodicity of about 46.
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Figure 18: Autocorrelation plots of HTTP Features - Zeus
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Figure 19: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Zeus

Figure 20: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Tinba
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Figure 21: Autocorrelation plots of HTTP Features - Tinba

Figure 22: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Tinba
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Figure 23: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Cerber
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Figure 24: Autocorrelation plots of HTTP Features - Cerber
4.7.3.2

Cryptolocker

Taken from the Contagio dataset, cryptolocker also shows a strong trend in most
of the DNS features shown in Figure 26 with a short term periodicity of around 9 and
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Figure 25: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Cerber
a long term periodicity around 50. The TCP plot in Figure 27 trend shows a peak
around 11 for most of the features, but more data will provide better confirmation.

Figure 26: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Cryptolocker
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Figure 27: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Cryptolocker
4.7.3.3

Locky

Locky’s DNS trend shown in Figure 28 and HTTP trend in Figure 29 show a
periodicity of 2 in some features. The TCP plot in Figure 30 contains a weak trend
at around a lag of 250, shown by a consistent peak across many of its features. The
traces analyzed are taken from Contagio dataset and Stratosphere IPS dataset.

Figure 28: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Locky
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Figure 29: Autocorrelation plots of HTTP Features - Locky
4.7.4

DDoS and Spam Botnets

Below are mentioned the analysis of the botnets that occur in DDoS and spam
application scenarios.
4.7.4.1

Agobot

Few of the features in Agobot DNS plot, shown in Figure 31 has a strong periodicity around 30. The HTTP (Figure 32) and TCP features (Figure 33) reveal weak
to no periodic information. The analyzed trace was taken from the Stratosphere IPS
dataset.
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Figure 30: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Locky
4.7.4.2

Avzhan

The network analysis of the Avzhan trace, taken from the Stratosphere IPS
dataset, shows little to no periodicity in Figures 34 and 35.
4.7.4.3

Cutwail-Pushdo

The analysis of Cutwail-Pushdo (from the Contagio dataset) is shown in Figures 36, 38 and 37. Some features show a weak periodicity between 60 and 80. The
general HTTP features show almost no periodicity but the features of specific connections do.
4.7.4.4

Rbot

Two traces of Rbot were used for analysis from the ISCX dataset. Both were
controlled by the dataset creators, with one being labeled as for DDoS and another
being applied to Port Scanning (PS). The plots differ in a few ways - some of the
features in the PS application show consistent peaks and periodicity, while in the
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Figure 31: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Agobot
DDoS trace, there is none seen. The features in the TCP plots seem similar. This
seems intuitive since port scanning is a frequent and repetitive process. We can
decipher that some features hold their trends irrespective of the end application.
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Figure 32: Autocorrelation plots of HTTP Features - Agobot
4.7.4.5

Storm Variant

The network analysis of Storm revealed no information about its periodicity in
DNS and TCP. HTTP in Figure 42 showed a good periodicity similar to Tinba.
4.8

Rolling Statistics and SVM results
The benign dataset used was taken from Stratosphere IPS dataset, except for

Rbot, which was taken from the ISCX dataset. Since rolling statistics smooth out
the noise, we would expect the AUC/Accuracy to increase. The number of malware
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Figure 33: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Agobot

Figure 34: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Avzhan
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Figure 35: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Avzhan

Figure 36: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Cutwail-Pushdo
and benign samples varied in each of the protocols across the botnets.
The results of Locky are given in the Figures 44 and 45. In DNS, many features maintained a 0.5 AUC and 100% accuracy over all the windows. Response
length (min) sum and mean showed an improvement in AUC between the 20 and
30 window sizes, while maintaining the 100% accuracy. The accuracy of query type
fell to 0 after 10 windows. Response type (standard deviation and variance) showed
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Figure 37: Autocorrelation plots of HTTP Features - Cutwail-Pushdo
an improvement in AUC between the 40 and 50 windows, while maintaining 100%
accuracy.
Similarly in HTTP, many features maintained a 0.5 AUC and 100% accuracy over
all the windows. Header Elements (sum and standard deviation) after 45 windows and
URI Length (sum and mean) after 25 windows approximately showed an improvement
in AUC while maintaining the accuracy.
In TCP, the port and flags feature stand out among all the other features maintaining a 0.5 AUC and 100% accuracy. The flags feature deteriorates while the port
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Figure 38: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Cutwail-Pushdo
feature improves almost linearly over as the window sizes increase.
The HTTP and TCP graphs of Tinba are given in the Figure 46. In HTTP,
the features such as cache time, content type, URI length, and data score improve
both in accuracy and AUC to reach 100% after 10 windows. The header elements
(sum and mean) AUC and accuracy maintain 100% accuracy and AUC throughout
all windows. In TCP, the flags and segment length feature improve to reach 100%
accuracy and AUC after 10 windows and 30 windows respectively.
The Rbot results are given in the Figure 47. In TCP, the flags (variance) increases
in AUC and accuracy constantly as the windows progress. The TCP length AUC sum
and mean reach 1.0 within 2nd and 8th windows, and after 10 windows respectively,
while maintaining accuracy at 100%.
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Figure 39: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Rbot
4.9

RFE Results
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) is a technique used to determine which

features contribute the most to the detection of the data samples. Figures show the
results of RFE on the raw data feature set of Tinba, Locky and Rbot. In the case of
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Figure 40: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Rbot

Figure 41: Autocorrelation plots of DNS Features - Storm Variant
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Figure 42: Autocorrelation plots of HTTP Features - Storm Variant

Figure 43: Autocorrelation plots of TCP Features - Storm Variant
Tinba, all the features maintained an AUC between 0.4 and 0.6 in DNS and TCP, as
shown in Figure 48. In HTTP, the highest accuracy and AUC of 0.96 each is achieved
with 10 and 4 features respectively. There, 7 of the 10 and 3 of the 4 features are
periodic.
In Locky, for DNS, the features which had same or similar data points had the
same impact as the periodic features. In HTTP and TCP, one weak periodic feature
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Figure 44: Accuracy and AUC (DNS and HTTP) - Locky
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Figure 45: Accuracy and AUC (TCP) - Locky
looked enough to generate 99% accuracy. But in all the cases AUC remained close to
0.5, as shown in Figure 49.
Figure 50 shows the DNS and TCP results for Rbot. In DNS, one periodic
feature (query type) which was periodic in training but not in testing, maintained
the accuracy and AUC. In TCP, surprisingly, all features were required to achieve the
highest accuracy and AUC.
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4.10

Clustering Results

In clustering, 11,8, and 11 botnets of approximately similar data sample size
were clustered in DNS, HTTP, and TCP respectively. EM showed better results
when compared to k-means. In EM, as seen from the results, 16 clusters showed the
best results of all the cluster sizes in DNS and TCP. In HTTP, 20 EM clusters for 8
botnets showed good results.
In DNS, all but SpyEye were analyzed, due to the limited number of data samples.
The data samples of Citadel, Tinba and Cerber were equally distributed across two
clusters each. Half of Tinba’s samples have been clustered with the Storm variant,
while Citadel and Cerber have two dedicated clusters to them. This seems to imply
that Tinba may have some characteristics of a spam botnet, while Citadel and Cerber
have two types of operations running under the hood, which are not clustered with
the other botnets. Similar analysis can be inferred from TCP and HTTP, the results
of which are shown in Figure 51.
4.11

Discussion

The concept of periodicity in the financial botnets that are chosen, ranged from
strong to weak. Some features in the DNS and TCP protocols were strong with
regular intervals in Citadel and weak with possible intervals in SpyEye. The HTTP
features in all the botnet data displayed a periodicity of 2, irrespective of whether
the same URL was accessed or not. This points to the thought that the content of
the requests and responses may be correlated. When SVM was used for the detection
of the Tinba botnet, the AUC score of some of the HTTP features improved in the
early windows itself, which could be associated to periodicity.
In ransomware, either DNS or HTTP data showed strong trends, while TCP was
either weak or inconclusive due to limited data. The results showed a strong trend
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of DNS and HTTP due to a string of ‘No such name’ responses for query resolution
and bad requests in HTTP. SVM was used for the detection of the Locky botnet, and
some of the DNS and HTTP features showed an improvement in the AUC in a range
of specific windows, while some TCP features deteriorated.
In DDoS and spam botnets, all the protocols ranged from strong to inconclusive. The Rbot botnet, which is used for different end applications, showed starkly
different periodicity features. This may point to the fact that either the similarity
in the internal implementation may not necessarily depict periodicity or the inherent
periodicity can be masked. During the detection of Rbot using SVM, there was some
improvement in a few TCP features. The end application of the traces were different,
and mostly impacted the detection.
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Figure 46: Accuracy and AUC - Tinba
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Figure 47: Accuracy and AUC - Rbot
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Figure 48: RFE results of Tinba
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Figure 49: RFE results of Locky
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Figure 50: RFE results of Rbot
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Figure 51: Clustering results statistics
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions and Future Work
We looked at four financial bots, three ransomwares and five DDoS and spam
bots, taken from public datasets. In order to observe the periodicity trends, we looked
at the autocorrelation plots of their HTTP, TCP, and DNS data, and used rolling
statistics on the raw data as input to the SVM machine learning algorithm. This
was done with the goal of the underlying periodic trends improving the accuracy
rate. The botnets were chosen for analysis according to their end applications, in the
hope that similarities in their implementation may give rise to certain similarities in
periodicities.
Periodicity was observed in many features of the bots in either/all of the three
protocols. The periodicity of two stood out, with different content in some bots. In
many bots, a strong periodicity stood out while in other bots, it was inconclusive.
In the case of a particular bot where the end application was changed, one showed
strong periodicity while the other was inconclusive. This also showed that periodicity
can be masked even if the underlying implementation is similar.
The SVM detection results showed many features improving in AUC as the windows progressed, while maintaining a good accuracy while a few features deteriorated
in the detection. This can be attributed to the reduction in noise.
5.1

Future Work
An entity like a bot which has a specific lifecycle will have a certain set of patterns.

And periodicity analysis is a step towards it. Mentioned below are some of the areas
where the analysis can be extended.
• Linux based botnets are steadily rising [37] due to the many vulnerabilities
without a reliable security solution. This project used public datasets which
were mainly collected on a Windows OS. The analysis of periodicity can be
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extended in Linux, where the protocols are similar.
• Many botnets use encryption/encoding/compression of their data to avoid detection while using techniques such as tunneling. In this project, in the bots
which used encoding/encryption, the data score feature was not considered.
The periodicity in the commands and communication can be analyzed and understood better when decrypted/decoded.
• Masking of the periodicity trends in a bot with different end applications can be
studied. The methods of masking and unmasking the periodicity can be looked
at, which may give further insight into the vulnerabilities of a botnet.
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